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Abstract
In order to achieve secure status in Canada, asylum seek-
ers must go through a lengthy, three-stage procedure in-
volving (1) eligibility determination, (2) refugee status
determination, and (3) application for permanent resi-
dence. Applicants are screened for security and criminal-
ity at both the first and third stages. During the third
stage, which can take upwards of eighteen months, refu-
gees find themselves in “legal limbo”: as recognized refu-
gees they have the right to remain in Canada, but beyond
that their rights are significantly curtailed.
The author argues that the repeat screening at the per-
manent resident stage is unnecessary and redundant, and
that the resulting delay in access to basic rights violates
Canada’s international obligations. The article concludes
with a proposal that permanent resident status be granted
automatically to refugees upon recognition as refugees.
Résumé
Pour obtenir un statut sûr au Canada, les demandeurs
d’asile doivent se soumettre à un long processus de sélec-
tion, comprenant (1) la détermination d’éligibilité, (2) la
détermination du statut de réfugié, et (3) la soumission
d’une demande pour le statut de résident permanent. Les
candidats subissent une procédure de sélection sur dossier
axée sur des considérations de sécurité et de criminalité à
la première étape et, de nouveau, à la troisième étape.
Durant la troisième étape, qui peut prendre jusqu’à 18
mois, les réfugiés se retrouvent dans un état juridique in-
déterminé : en tant que réfugié reconnu, ils ont le droit
de rester au Canada; mais mise à part ce fait, leurs droits
sont sensiblement restreints. L’auteur soutient que l’exa-
men au peigne fin une nouvelle fois, au stade de résident
permanent, est superflu et redondant, et que le délai à
l’accès aux droits fondamentaux qui en découle fait que
le Canada enfreint ses obligations internationales.L’arti-
cle conclut avec une recommandation que le statut de ré-
sident permanent soit automatiquement octroyé aux
réfugiés dès l’instant où ils sont reconnus comme réfugiés.
Introduction
In 2003, the Government of Canada selected 7,505women, men, and children seeking asylum from perse-cution and  brought  them  to  Canada from  overseas.
Churches and  other  private  groups sponsored a  further
3,247 refugees, while 11,250 refugees who claimed protec-
tion after coming to Canada on their own were granted
permanent  residence in  2003, along with  3,958 of their
dependants overseas.1
For those refugees brought to Canada by the government
or sponsoring groups, arrival at the border generally marks
the end of a long road.  Upon arrival they are granted
permanent resident status and can apply for Canadian
citizenship three years later. For those who  make it to
Canada on their own and seek asylum at the border or
within the country, however, arrival in Canada marks the
beginning of a whole new ordeal.
Canada’s refugee program is rooted in international law.
The individual right to asylum is enshrined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which states: “Eve-
ryone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries
asylum from persecution.”2 The 1951 Convention relating
to the Status of Refugees3 and its 1967 Protocol4 give content
to the right guaranteed by the UDHR, by setting out the
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obligations of states with respect to asylum seekers. States
that have become parties to the Convention are bound by
Article 33 not to expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee “to
the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would
be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opin-
ion.”5 The prohibition on refoulement specifically to torture
is also provided for in Article 3 of the 1984 Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment,6 and Article 7 of the 1966 Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.7 So well
entrenched is the principle of non-refoulement to torture
that it has evolved into a customary norm of international
law,8 applicable to states regardless of whether they are
parties to one of the relevant conventions.
As a result of the principle of non-refoulement, states par-
ties are obliged to consider the claims of those who request
asylum in their territory or at their frontier. Canada’s Immi-
gration and Refugee Protection Act9 (IRPA) reflects these prin-
ciples by providing for the conferral of refugee status, or
“protected person” status.10 In order to receive such protec-
tion, claimants must meet a refugee definition based on the
Refugee Convention, or show they face a risk of torture, a risk
to life, or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punish-
ment, as set out in the Convention Against Torture. They must
also meet certain eligibility and admissibility criteria, as dis-
cussed below. Once they have been formally recognized as
refugees and granted Canada’s protection, refugees are enti-
tled to remain in Canada.11
Recognition as a refugee or protected person, however,
does not result in refugees receiving equal treatment with
other residents of Canada. While protection from refoule-
ment is generally the most immediate concern for most
refugees upon arrival, other key rights protections are not
available to them even after refugee protection has been
granted. In order to enjoy the full range of rights enjoyed
by other residents of Canada, refugees must apply for and
be granted “permanent resident” status. Only after such
status has been granted are refugees in a position to become
full and (nearly) equal12 participants in Canadian society.
Three steps to permanent status
Refugee protection claimants seeking Canada’s permanent
protection  must proceed via a three-step process of  (1)
eligibility, (2) refugee status determination, and (3) perma-
nent residence.13
Step 1: Eligibility Determination
Under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA),
protection claimants must pass an “eligibility” determina-
tion before their  protection claim  may be heard by the
Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refu-
gee Board (IRB). Eligibility determination includes both
administrative matters and a criminality and security
screening. Under section 100(1) of IRPA, immigration offi-
cers have three working days  (seventy-two  hours)  from
receipt of the claim to determine whether the claim is eligible
to be referred to the Refugee Protection Division. If the three
days pass without a determination by the immigration offi-
cer who received the claim, then the claim is “deemed to be
referred.”14 (It is worth noting, however, that in the event
that information comes to light after referral, the immigra-
tion officer retains the power to reclassify the claim as ineli-
gible, suspending and eventually terminating consideration
of the claim by the Refugee Protection Division.15)
Further to a January 2003 directive issued by Citizenship
and Immigration Canada (CIC), officials must interview all
refugee claimants arriving at the border to elicit informa-
tion for admissibility, security, and criminality screening.
The policy is to have “a full and complete front-end screening
(examination) before the claimant is allowed into Can-
ada.”16 Where, due to high volumes of arrivals or insuffi-
cient resources, officers find they are unable to complete
the eligibility determinations within the stipulated three
working days, the directive instructs them to detain17 or
“direct back” claimants as measures of last resort. IRPA
gives immigration officers discretion to detain a refugee
claimant, without a warrant, in a variety of circumstances,
including:
• in order to complete an examination,18 or
• if the officer has “reasonable grounds to believe” the
person is inadmissible and poses a danger to the pub-
lic,19 or
• if the officer has “reasonable grounds to suspect” the
person is inadmissible on grounds of security or for
violating human or international rights,20 or
• if the officer “is not satisfied of the identity of the foreign
national…”21
Until their claim has been referred to the Refugee Pro-
tection Division, claimants have no legal status in Canada
and are extremely vulnerable. Not only may they be de-
tained without a warrant (this may also happen after refer-
ral), they are also ineligible to work, study, or receive social
assistance or publicly funded medical care.
Step 2: Refugee Status Determination
Claims that are found or deemed eligible are referred to the
Refugee Protection Division of the IRB, a quasi-judicial
tribunal. A one-member panel22 makes a determination of
the merits of the protection claim, usually following an oral
hearing.23 While the lion’s share of the Refugee Protection
Division’s work involves assessing whether a claimant
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should be granted protection, it should be noted that the
Division also applies the “exclusion clauses” of the Refugee
Convention. The exclusion clauses allow states to deny refu-
gee status to claimants for whom, though they may meet the
definition of a Convention refugee, there are serious
grounds to believe they have committed a crime against
peace, war crime, crime against humanity, serious non-po-
litical crime, or “acts contrary to the purposes and principles
of the United Nations.”24 This is a second opportunity to
screen out persons believed to pose a security or criminal
threat to Canada or Canadians. In addition, if evidence later
comes to light indicating that refugee protection was ob-
tained fraudulently, the Minister may at any time seek to
revoke (“vacate”) that status.25
The average processing time by the Refugee Protection
Division is approximately twelve to sixteen months. During
this period, claimants may apply for and are generally
granted a temporary, renewable student authorization.26 If
they are unable to otherwise support themselves, claimants
may apply for, and are generally granted, a temporary,
renewable employment authorization.27 There are, how-
ever, restrictions on the types of employment in which
refugee claimants may engage.
While refugee claimants do not have access to provincial
health insurance programs, they are covered by the Interim
Federal Health (IFH) program, which covers emergency
and essential health services, essential prescription medica-
tions, contraception, prenatal, and obstetrical care.28 There
is no charge for the IFH coverage. Depending on their
province of residence,29 refugee claimants may also be eli-
gible for social assistance, provided they demonstrate that
they have obtained or at least applied for an employment
authorization and that they are looking for work.30 As well,
refugee claimants seeking college or university education
are generally charged tuition at foreign student rates, up-
wards of twice the rate charged to domestic students.31
They are usually ineligible for public or private loans and
credit cards, and may face difficulty in securing rental
accommodation or employment, as landlords and employ-
ers are often wary of their insecure and temporary status in
Canada.
Upon being found to be a protected person by the Refu-
gee Protection Division, a person may apply for a status
document indicating her/his new status.32 Protected per-
sons may not be removed to their country of origin except
in very exceptional circumstances relating to national secu-
rity or public safety.33 Protected person status is thus gen-
erally more secure than refugee claimant status. Protected
persons are eligible for full provincial health insurance,
usually after a three-month waiting period, during which
they continue to be covered by IFH.34 They continue to be
eligible for (restricted) work and study permits without
cost. Post-secondary institutions in some provinces charge
domestic tuition rates to protected persons, and as of Au-
gust 2004 protected persons are also eligible for federal and
in most provinces provincial student loans.35
Though better off than claimants, protected persons re-
main very vulnerable. While they have Canada’s protection
against refoulement and have access to many basic rights
and privileges, their status is temporary and their rights and
access to services are narrowly proscribed. As will be dis-
cussed further below, they face significant legal restrictions
in employment and mobility and are unable to sponsor
close family members including spouses and children.
Step 3: Permanent Resident Status
Upon recognition as refugees, protected persons are eligible
to apply for permanent resident status36 (previously known
as “landed immigrant” status). This policy reflects Article 34
of the Refugee Convention, which obliges states to “as far as
possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of
refugees.” Permanent resident status confers many of the
rights and privileges available to Canadian citizens,37 and
enables holders of the status to apply for Canadian citizen-
ship after three years.38 Protected persons seeking perma-
nent resident status in Canada must file a written
application, along with the required processing fees, within
180 days of the positive determination by the IRB.39 Appli-
cations are generally approved, provided they are not found
to be inadmissible. These inadmissibility grounds are nearly
identical to the grounds for ineligibility, which are consid-
ered at the front end of the process
Under the previous legislation, CIC’s call centre reported
that permanent residence applications took twelve to
twenty-four months to process.40 The application kit ex-
plained that “these time frames include the 90-day applica-
tion processing period” at CIC, but that CIC “has little
control over the time it takes to complete medical, criminal
and security checks.”41 This would suggest that the bulk of
the waiting time (everything beyond the ninety days for
processing) was caused by the background checks. Where
processing extends beyond eighteen months, criminality
clearances have to be renewed – a process that could in itself
take a further six months. Similarly medical clearances,
which lapse after twelve months, may need to be renewed,
which requires re-examination by a physician. The delays
caused by trying to synchronize the validity of these two
certificates alone cause additional hardship and frustration
to refugees.
Despite the new front-end screening procedures, little
seems to have changed in the processing of permanent
residence  applications. Permanent residence application
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kits produced after the implementation of IRPA provide no
guidance on processing times, aside from the following
general acknowledgement:
The length of time it takes to receive permanent resident status
varies considerably depending on individual cases. Factors such
as if you have dependent children residing outside Canada or if
you have lived in several countries may lengthen the process.
CIC has little control over the time it takes to complete medical,
criminal, and security checks.42
It seems, therefore, that the timeline continues to be
determined primarily by the inadmissibility screening
process – a process rendered largely redundant by the dra-
matic new emphasis on front-end screening.43 For appli-
cants who have included family members abroad in their
application or who lack identity documents, the time it
takes to get permanent resident status can stretch on indefi-
nitely.44 There are no enforceable public standards for proc-
essing of permanent residence applications, nor is there a
formal complaint or review mechanism where timelines
become unreasonable.45 During this indefinite processing
and background check period, refugees remain in “legal
limbo.”
Life in Legal Limbo
While in general recognized refugees may expect to proceed
relatively quickly to permanent resident status, the reality
for many is that it takes a year or longer. The United Nations
High Commission for Refugees has expressed concern that
“the inability to obtain permanent residence status can be
a serious impediment to integration into Canadian soci-
ety.”46 Indeed, life in Canada while waiting for permanent
resident status is, in many ways, life on hold.
The single most painful and damaging aspect of life in
legal limbo is prolonged, agonizing, and often unforeseen
family separation. It is widely recognized that due to the
many barriers facing asylum seekers, refugee families are
often split up, one parent attempting the perilous journey
alone while the other remains behind with the children in
the country of origin or the country of first asylum.47 Upon
gaining asylum in Canada, then, family reunification be-
comes the main concern of most refugees; indeed, the
newcomer community generally does not consider anyone
settled in Canada until their family is here.
As will be discussed below, international human rights
law protects the integrity of the family and recognizes the
universal right of children to be with their parents. Never-
theless, until they are granted permanent resident status,
protected persons including Convention refugees are pro-
hibited from bringing their children and spouses to live
with them in Canada. This means that, even in a straight-
forward case, refugees will not be reunited with their family
in Canada for almost two and a half years.
In some cases, overseas dependants are not included in
the original application for permanent residence. The rea-
sons for this vary, from bad advice to an inability to locate
the dependants within the 180-day period in which the
permanent residence application must be filed. While keep-
ing overseas dependants off the original application will
facilitate faster processing of the refugee’s permanent resi-
dence, it may have the drawback of significantly delaying
acquisition of permanent resident status for the refugee’s
dependants. Dependants  who were not included in  the
refugee’s original application for permanent residence have
one year from the day the refugee was granted permanent
resident status to appear at a visa office and request perma-
nent residence. They will be processed as part of the refu-
gee’s application. Failing that, the refugee who was granted
permanent residence will have to begin the process of spon-
soring their dependants under the Family Class. (In some
cases, the dependant will have surpassed the age limit for
sponsorship by this time, and will become ineligible to be
sponsored.) As well, they will be required to pay the $975
Right of Permanent Residence fee if they take this route
(refugees are exempted from this fee for their own applica-
tions). According to CIC, Family Class sponsorships take
anywhere from six months to twenty months, or longer.
Thus refugee families are routinely separated for three years
or more if they are not all on the same permanent residence
application.  Any  extended  family  separation has conse-
quences for emotional and financial health. Psychological
problems experienced by families that have suffered severe
trauma are exacerbated.48
Until recently, Convention refugees who had not yet
been granted permanent resident status also faced signifi-
cant barriers to travel outside Canada. They were generally
not given Canadian travel documents and were thus not
guaranteed  re-entry to Canada if  they left the  country.
While refugees who had “satisfactory identity documents”
could seek an exception to this rule on humanitarian and
compassionate grounds, undocumented refugees were de-
nied even this possibility.49 With the implementation of the
new IRPA in 2002, however, protected persons became
eligible to apply for a Convention Refugee Travel Docu-
ment (CRTD), after first acquiring a Protected Person
Status Document. The CRTD is  valid for travel to  any
country except the refugee’s country of origin. While this
should in principle eliminate concerns about refugees’ abil-
ity to travel, there are reports that undocumented refugees
continue to find themselves denied a CRTD, though they
may under exceptional circumstances be granted a tempo-
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rary permit for emergency travel, valid for a single re-entry
to Canada.50
Refugees who have not yet been granted permanent
residence face several obstacles to employment. To begin
with, they must apply for and regularly renew temporary
work permits. Delays in processing applications at CIC
often result in gaps in coverage.51 Some refugees have re-
ported being laid off during these gaps; others have been
fired when their employers discovered their authorization
was not valid. Further, refugees have long reported that they
face discrimination by potential employers because their
Social Insurance Number, which begins with a “9”, indi-
cates their temporary status in Canada. Some find it more
difficult to get employment that requires training, because
employers are unwilling to invest resources training work-
ers who they assume may only be in Canada temporarily.52
Other  refugees report  that they are more vulnerable to
exploitation by  employers because employers  know the
difficulty refugees face in finding stable and adequately paid
work. Without permanent resident status, protected per-
sons are denied access to certain professions and to some
types of employment that require specific insurance, in-
cluding employment in the education and health care sec-
tors. They are also ineligible for government training
programs. Lack of permanent resident status also restricts
access to bank loans, thereby limiting self-employment or
entrepreneurship opportunities.
This exclusion and marginalization of refugees from
mainstream society as a result of these restrictions has social
and economic costs not just for the individuals directly
affected, but also for their communities and for broader
society. With respect to the social costs, it is important to
recognize that refugees are by definition people who have
suffered and/or have grounds to fear serious persecution.
Many have been tortured or seen loved ones tortured or
killed. They have come to Canada to seek refuge and to
rebuild their lives. The sooner they are allowed and encour-
aged to do this fully, the sooner they will become fully
functioning and self-supporting participants in Canadian
society. On the other hand, the longer they are kept in
limbo, the more entrenched they will become in marginal-
ized communities, making it increasingly difficult to inte-
grate into Canadian society.
International Law on the Treatment of Refugees
While there is no right to permanent resident status for
refugees per se in either international refugee law or inter-
national human rights law, these areas of law do guarantee
refugees a range of important civil, political, economic,
social, and cultural rights. Unfortunately, in Canada the
ability to enjoy these universal human rights is limited by a
person’s immigration status.
As the basic treaty on states’ obligations vis-à-vis refu-
gees, the 1951 Refugee Convention includes provisions on
the treatment that states parties must provide to refugees in
their territory. At a minimum, the Convention requires
states to treat refugees as they treat aliens generally53 and to
refrain from discriminating among refugees on the basis of
their race, religion or country of origin.54 However, the
Convention provides for higher levels of protection in sev-
eral specific areas. For example, states are obliged to treat
refugees at least as favourably as they do their own nationals
with respect to: freedom of religion,55 access to the courts,56
access to elementary education,57 public relief,58 labour law
protection,59 and social security.60 In other areas, refugees
must be given “the most favourable treatment accorded to
nationals of a foreign country, in the same circumstances”
(e.g. non-political, non-profit freedom of association and
trade unions,61 employment62) or treatment “as favourable
as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that
accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances”
(e.g. property rights,63 housing,64 education other than ele-
mentary, recognition of foreign credentials,65 and mobility
rights66). In addition, the Refugee Convention obliges states
to provide refugees with administrative assistance,67 iden-
tity papers,68 and travel documents.69
A number of the rights set out in the Refugee Convention
are limited to refugees who are “lawfully staying” in the
territory of the contracting state.70 Canadian officials have
sometimes argued that this language allows Canada to deny
the rights that are qualified in this way to recognized refu-
gees who have not acquired permanent resident status. As
Guy Goodwin-Gill and Judith Kumin have pointed out,
however, this interpretation of the Refugee Convention is
incorrect.71 Canada has a reservation to Articles 23 (public
relief) and 24 (labour legislation and social security) pro-
viding that “Canada interprets the phrase ‘lawfully staying’
as referring only to refugees admitted for permanent resi-
dence; refugees admitted for temporary residence will be
accorded the same treatment with respect to matters dealt
with in Articles 23 and 24 as is accorded visitors gener-
ally.”72 This reservation was made only for those two arti-
cles, however; no such reservations were made with respect
to any of the other articles that use the “lawfully staying”
language. In the absence of a reservation, the other articles
must be read to apply not just to permanent residents but
also to recognized refugees.
The rights protections articulated by the Refugee Conven-
tion have been significantly supplemented by the develop-
ment of the international human rights regime in the
intervening fifty years, and need to be interpreted in the
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light of these developments.73 Treaties such as the 1966
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights74 and
the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights75 give legal expression to the more general
commitments of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. Other treaties such as the Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,76 the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,77
and the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child78 have
combined to much more fully articulate a normative base-
line of universal rights that states must respect.
The basic principle of  non-discrimination  lies  at the
heart of all of these treaties. As the UN Special Rapporteur
on the Rights of Non-Citizens has observed, “The architec-
ture of international human rights law is built on the prem-
ise that all persons, by virtue of their essential humanity,
should enjoy all human rights.”79 All persons, regardless of
their national or ethnic origin, immigration status, or other
irrelevant criteria, are equally entitled to have their human
rights respected. The Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights prohibits any distinction between citizens
and non-citizens with respect to economic, social, and
cultural rights.80 The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
provides that, in times of domestic stability, differential
treatment of non-citizens is not permissible except with
respect to political participation rights and certain rights of
entry and residence.81
Different treatment of non-citizens on the basis of na-
tionality may, in some circumstances, be permissible in
international law, according to the Special Rapporteur.
Article 1(3) of the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination provides: “Nothing in this
Convention may be interpreted as affecting in any way the
legal provisions of States Parties concerning nationality,
citizenship or naturalization, provided that such provisions
do not discriminate against any particular nationality.”82
Criteria for differential treatment must be assessed in light
of the objects and purposes  of this Convention.  As the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
the UN expert body responsible for interpreting and moni-
toring compliance with the Convention, has observed in its
General Recommendation 14, “In seeking to determine
whether an action has an effect contrary to the Convention,
[the Committee] will look to see whether that action has an
unjustifiable disparate impact upon a group distinguished
by race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin.”83
However, immigration status may be used as a ground
for differential treatment only in limited areas. For exam-
ple, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights may permit
states to deny undocumented non-citizens freedom of
movement (Art. 12), the right to choose their residence
(Art. 12), and the right to certain procedural protections in
expulsion proceedings (Art. 13). These provisions should,
however, be read also in the light of the Refugee Convention,
which requires that states provide undocumented refugees
with identity papers. The latter provision would thus re-
move refugees from the group against whom the state may
discriminate under Articles 12 and 13 of the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.
Articles 16(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 23(1) of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
and 17(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights all
provide: “The family is the natural and fundamental group
unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and
the State.” Similar provisions may be found in the Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,84 the African Char-
ter on Human and Peoples Rights,85 and the European Social
Charter.86 Indeed, it has been observed that there is a “uni-
versal consensus” on the right of the family to respect and
protection.87 Recognition of the family as the “fundamental
group unit of society” necessarily entails a right to family
unity, for as Kate Jastram and Kathleen Newland observe,
“if members of the family did not have the right to live
together, there would not be a ‘group’ to respect or pro-
tect.”88
Children are granted special rights and protections un-
der international law in view of their particular vulnerabil-
ity. The Convention on the Rights of the Child requires states
to make the best interests of the child a primary considera-
tion in all actions that concern them, and to ensure protec-
tion and care for children, taking into account the rights
and duties of their parents and guardians.89 The Convention
on the Rights of the Child includes specific provisions for
children who have been separated from their parents or
guardians.90 It requires, inter alia, that “applications by a
child or his or her parents to enter or leave a State Party for
the purpose of family reunification shall be dealt with by
States Parties in a positive, humane and expeditious man-
ner.”91 Further, “A child whose parents reside in different
States shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis,
save in exceptional circumstances, personal relations and
direct contacts with both parents.”92
The importance of family unity for refugees in particular
was recognized in the Final Act of the Conference that
adopted the Refugee Convention, which provides that “the
unity of the family … is an essential right of the refugee,”
and urges states to “take the necessary measures for the
protection of the refugee’s family.”93
The right of every person to leave any country is articu-
lated in Article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, as well as, inter alia, in Article 12(2) of the Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and Article 22(2) of the Ameri-
Permanent Protection
93
can Declaration of Human Rights. Refugees who lack iden-
tity or travel documents, however, are often unable to
exercise the right, as such documents are required both to
gain entry to another country and to re-enter their country
of asylum. Recognizing this pitfall, the framers of the 1951
Refugee Convention included a provision explicitly requir-
ing that states parties provide the necessary documents to
undocumented refugees in their territory. Article 28 of the
Refugee Convention obliges states to “issue to refugees law-
fully staying in their  territory  travel documents  for the
purpose of travel outside their territory, unless compelling
reasons of national security or public order otherwise re-
quire.” The article further requires that states “in particular
give sympathetic consideration to the issue of such a travel
document to refugees in their territory who are unable to
obtain a travel document from the country of their lawful
residence.”
In their analysis of previous Canadian practice with respect
to refugee documentation, Goodwin-Gill and Kumin note
that in the absence of a reservation, Article 28 permits few
exceptions to the obligation to provide travel documents to
refugees. The reference to “compelling” reasons of national
security and public order as justifying an exception clearly
indicates that a restrictive interpretation of this exception is
called for.94 The authors conclude that Canada’s then failure
to provide travel documents to Convention refugees who
need them violated Canada’s international legal obligation.
Though as noted Canada has subsequently begun to issue
Convention Refugee Travel Documents to refugees, the fail-
ure to do so for undocumented refugees constitutes an on-
going violation of this obligation.
The right to work is enshrined in numerous interna-
tional human rights instruments, including Article 23(1) of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 6(1) of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, and Article 14 of the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man. The right to work, including the
right to equal access to employment and to equal treatment
in the workplace, has also been elaborated in some detail
through a variety of International Labour Organization
instruments. The Refugee Convention itself requires that
states treat refugees at least equally to foreign nationals with
respect to employment, and encourages states to assimilate
their rights with those of nationals.95
With respect to protected persons in Canada, however,
the issue is not whether their legal right to work is formally
recognized by the Canadian government – it is – but the
degree to which protected persons can actually enjoy that
right. The impact on employment and training opportuni-
ties of having temporary status in Canada, combined with
restrictions on access to certain regulated occupations,
means that refugees have less access to employment than
Canadians and permanent residents.  This falls afoul of
Canada’s international legal obligation to treat refugees
without discrimination, as discussed above.
Status in Canada of International Legal
Protections
Though Canada is party to all of the international human
rights and refugee instruments discussed above, the federal
legislature has not enacted “implementing legislation” to
incorporate these instruments directly into domestic law.
Government officials as well as Justice Department lawyers
have traditionally argued that because the treaties have not
been legally implemented, Canada is not bound to comply
with them.96 However, the law of treaty interpretation,
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, and an important new
provision in IRPA all indicate that international obligations
voluntarily undertaken are far from irrelevant – rather,
Canada is obliged to comply.
The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties sets
out the basic law of treaty interpretation. A core provision
of the Vienna Convention, which is also recognized as a
pre-existing peremptory norm of international law, is the
principle of good faith performance, known as pacta sunt
servanda. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention states: “Every
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith.”97 Thus when Canada
became a party to the Refugee Convention, the two Cove-
nants and other human rights instruments, it took on
international legal obligations to perform its obligations in
good faith. That Canada must, according to international
law, do what it promised to do, cannot be in doubt.
Domestic jurisprudence, on the one hand, has tradition-
ally drawn a sharp line between international law and do-
mestic law. Only treaties that had been explicitly and
directly incorporated into Canadian law were considered
by the courts to have binding authority.98 On the other
hand, however, the court has long recognized the rule that
statutes should be interpreted as far as possible in conform-
ity with international law,99 and it is now accepted that the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is to be inter-
preted in accordance with similar international human
rights norms.100 In fact, recent case law goes further. In
Pushpanathan v. Canada (MCI),101 Bastarache J writing for
the majority applied the Vienna Convention to assess Can-
ada’s obligations under the Refugee Convention, noting that
the Court had used the Vienna Convention for this purpose
in two previous cases.102 In Baker v. Canada (MCI),103 the
Supreme Court ruled that immigration officers were
obliged to consider the Convention on the Rights of the Child
– an unimplemented international treaty to which Canada
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is a party – in decisions affecting children. The majority
cites the principle that “the legislature is presumed to re-
spect the values and principles enshrined in international
law, both customary and conventional.”104 This approach
has been affirmed in numerous subsequent decisions.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is a crucial
new provision in IRPA that did not exist in the previous
Immigration Act. Expanding on the legislative objective to
“fulfill Canada’s international legal obligations with respect
to refugees,”105 section 3(3)(f) provides: “This Act is to be
construed and applied in a manner that … complies with
international human rights instruments to which Canada
is signatory.” This provision unambiguously imports Can-
ada’s international human rights obligations directly to the
IRPA. By adding this provision to the new Act the legisla-
ture signaled to the Court that it intends to be legally bound
by international human rights law in the field of immigra-
tion and refugee law – in any matter governed by IRPA. The
earlier hesitation of the Court to bind the legislature to
international treaties negotiated and ratified only by the
executive should be firmly dispelled by the adoption of this
provision by the legislature itself. Indeed, the Federal Court
appears to have recognized this fundamental change in a
number of recent decisions.106
This has significant implications for refugees in legal
limbo. While Canada is under no legal obligation, domestic
or international, specifically to provide permanent resident
status to recognized refugees, it nevertheless is under an
international obligation to treat them without distinction
based on immigration status. As laid out above, interna-
tional human rights law is very specific about the rights that
must be accorded to all persons without distinction. Cur-
rent distinctions between refugee status and permanent
resident status violate these international obligations,
which, under section 3(3)(f) of IRPA, are now also domestic
legal obligations.
Faulty Rationales
Considering the many difficulties faced by refugees await-
ing permanent residence and the fact that, as noted above,
the vast majority of refugees become permanent residents
eventually, one must question the policy of maintaining
three distinct stages. Canada has an established and clearly
articulated policy of granting permanent residence to Con-
vention refugees. CIC itself describes the application for
permanent  residence  as  “the  next step”107 for protected
persons, and the IRPA requires that such applications be
approved, so long as the applicant has not violated the
regulations in applying and is not inadmissible.108 Section
21(2) of IRPA provides that a protected person becomes a
permanent resident:
if the officer is satisfied that they have made their application in
accordance with the regulations and that they are not inadmis-
sible on any ground referred to in section 34 [security] or 35
[violating human  or  international rights],  subsection 36(1)
[serious criminality] or section 37 [organized criminality] or 38
[danger to public health or safety].109
CIC has in the past acknowledged the importance for
refugees of acquiring permanent resident status as quickly
as possible:
Convention refugees who do not become permanent residents
in Canada remain without legal status... They enjoy only limited
protection: they have a right not to be returned to the country
where they fear persecution, but they do not have a right to
return  to Canada  once they leave....  Refugees who are  not
permanent residents may legally take employment only if they
are in possession of an employment authorization.... It is im-
portant that they initiate the landing process as early as possi-
ble...in order to entitle them to privileges and services that are
acquired with full legal status.110
The existence of separate steps for protected person
status followed by permanent resident status does not ap-
pear to reflect an intention to maintain two separate popu-
lations in Canada. Rather, refugee or protected person
status is a way-station on the road to permanent residence.
It is a way-station built under the previous legislation, prior
to the shift to front-end screening, and provided the gov-
ernment with a first opportunity to assess the admissibility
(particularly with respect to security and criminality) of
persons en route from refugee claimant to permanent resi-
dent status. This way-station is now unnecessary and re-
dundant. The screening conducted at the front end is more
than adequate to screen out those who may be inadmissible
for permanent residence. Requiring protected persons to
undergo a second screening before granting them perma-
nent residence is both cruel to the individuals affected and
wasteful of limited public resources.
The rationales that have traditionally been put forward
to justify the current approach do nothing to diminish this
conclusion. The two most compelling rationales will be
briefly discussed below.
The first and perhaps most obvious justification is that
asylum and permanent residence are inherently quite dis-
tinct. Asylum is an internationally recognized human right
rooted in international law. As a party to the Refugee Con-
vention as well as numerous international human rights
treaties, Canada must grant protection to refugees, and
must treat them in accordance with the Convention and
international human rights standards for as long as they
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remain on Canadian territory or are otherwise under the
jurisdiction of Canadian authorities. However, Canada has
no similar legal obligation to provide permanent-resident
status. In contrast to the human right to asylum, perma-
nent-resident status is considered by the Canadian govern-
ment to be a “privilege” which Canada may or may not
confer, according to its own policy interests.111
This distinction – between protection and permanent
stay – is a matter of lively debate at the international level.
It is argued by some that the conflation of refugee status and
permanent residence is one of the reasons for the erosion
in public support for asylum, and is damaging the always
fragile political will of many, perhaps most, states to par-
ticipate in refugee protection at all.112 Whatever may be the
merits of maintaining the distinction in other jurisdictions,
however, it makes little sense in Canada.
Perhaps the most glaring legal problem with the pro-
posed distinction between refugee protection as interna-
tional law and permanent residence as sovereign Canadian
domestic policy is that, as discussed, Canada does not
recognize some of the rights guaranteed to refugees by the
Refugee Convention and international human rights law
until they have attained permanent residence.113 As long as
Canada continues to withhold from protected persons
rights and benefits promised under the Refugee Convention
and other international treaties, and to confer them only
upon acquisition of permanent resident status, it cannot
argue that permanent residence is purely a privilege that
Canada is not obliged to grant to refugees under interna-
tional law. While permanent residence may not be explicitly
required under the Refugee Convention (though it is
strongly encouraged by Article 34), some of the benefits
that are only available upon becoming a permanent resi-
dent are guaranteed to refugees under such international
instruments as the Refugee Convention, the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic Social and Cultural Rights, and the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights.
Canada is thus obliged either to grant permanent residence
to protected persons, or to reform the existing regime to
ensure that those with protected person status enjoy all of the
rights and benefits to which they are entitled under interna-
tional law. While the latter option would allow the govern-
ment to maintain the two separate  statuses, there  are a
number of fairly significant practical drawbacks. One is that
such an approach would require amendments to a wide range
of federal laws and policies that restrict certain benefits to
permanent residents and citizens. It would also require ne-
gotiations with other levels of government and institutions
that currently provide services, to ensure that they begin to
provide their services also to protected persons.114
The other major argument for maintaining two separate
steps relates to questions of security and serious criminality.
The increased focus on terrorism in recent years has height-
ened concerns that terrorists might abuse the refugee deter-
mination system in order to remain in Canada to plan and
raise funds for attacks against the U.S or even against Ca-
nadian targets. This fear underlies many reforms in the
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and associated
regulations.  The same concerns have led  to changes  in
procedure introduced independently of the new legislation.
Perhaps most important has been the shift in the timing of
the screening procedure. Questions of security and serious
criminality that were previously left for investigation at the
permanent residence stage are now being addressed at the
front end of the refugee determination process as well,
during the eligibility stage. While such early screening
makes good policy sense, the result of the introduction of
front-end screening is that individuals are screened twice
for almost identical factors.
The ineligibility and inadmissibility criteria related to
criminality and security are identical in nearly every re-
spect. To the extent that they are identical there is no need,
from a security perspective, to maintain separate stages for
protection and for permanent residence at least in princi-
ple. The vast majority of asylum seekers are neither ineligi-
ble nor inadmissible; those who are will be screened out at
the front end. A second screening at the permanent resi-
dence stage is redundant.
Conclusion
The foregoing analysis indicates that the current three-stage
refugee procedure of eligibility, refugee determination, and
permanent residence is neither necessary nor just, and is
counterproductive. It is unnecessary from a security per-
spective, and is unjust in that it delays full realization of
certain basic rights that are guaranteed to refugees and their
families. It is counterproductive because it delays integra-
tion for refugees, sometimes resulting in long-term costs to
both the affected individuals and families and to the com-
munity at large. It is also unnecessary in view of the variety
of remedial measures available to the Minister should there
be cause to revoke permanent residency after it has been
conferred. Indeed, if at any time an immigration officer
reaches the opinion that a permanent resident is inadmis-
sible, the Minister may refer the case to an inadmissibility
hearing following which the individual may be removed
from Canada.115
The solution to the vexing problem of refugee limbo is
therefore to amend Canadian immigration policy, whether
through the Act itself or via the regulations, to dispense with
the second screening and to automatically grant permanent
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residence to protected persons.116 Such a move would bring
Canadian policy closer to the international human rights
standards it is obliged to respect, allowing refugees to enjoy
without unjustifiable delay the full range of rights to which
they are entitled under international law.
Notes
1. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, The Monitor, Spring
2004, Table 1, online: <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/monitor/
issue05/02-immigrants .html>.
2. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217 A (III),
UN Doc. A/810 (1948), online: <http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/
lang/eng.htm>. It is also included in Article 28 of the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 1948, online:
<http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/basic2.htm>.
3. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 150, Can. T.S. 1969/6 (entered into force 22 April
1954, accession by Canada 2 September 1969) [Refugee Con-
vention].
4. Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 16 December 1966,
606 U.N.T.S. 267, Can. T.S. 1969/29 (entered into force 4
October 1967,  accession by Canada 4 June 1969), online:
<http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/o_p_ref.htm>.
5. The non-refoulement provision is subject to exceptions. Article
1(C–F) sets out circumstances under which a refugee may be
excluded from protection, including for having committed
war crimes, crimes against humanity, serious non-political
crimes, etc.
6. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984,
A/RES/39/46, Can. T.S. 1987/36 (entered into force 26 June
1987, ratified by Canada 24 June 1987), online: <http://www.
unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h_cat39.htm>.
7. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 Decem-
ber 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, Can. T.S. 1976/47 (entered into
force 23 March 1976, accession by Canada 19 May 1976).
[ICCPR], online: <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/
a_ccpr.htm>.  Article 7 refers to the right to be free from
torture, but this provision has been interpreted by the UN
Human Rights  Committee to include a guarantee against
refoulement to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treat-
ment or punishment (General Comment 6 of the Human
Rights Committee; UN Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 at 6 (1994).
8. E. Lauterpacht and D. Bethlehem, “The Scope and Content of
the Principle of Non-Refoulement” in E. Feller, V. Turk, and
F. Nicholson, eds., Refugee Protection in International Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 216.
9. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, [IRPA] R.S.C. 2001,
c. 27.
10. IRPA, s. 95. In this paper, “refugee” and “protected person”
are used interchangeably.
11. Only if they cease to require protection (for example, if the
conditions that caused them to flee no longer exist) or lose
their status due to misrepresentation may they be returned.
12. While permanent resident status provides a wide range of
rights and benefits, full legal  equality requires citizenship
status, which may be conferred on permanent residents after
a  three-year  waiting  period (reduced by up to a year  for
refugees).
13. This paper focuses on refugees who are recognized by the
Immigration Refugee Board. However those who are rejected
by the Refugee Protection Division or who are determined to
be ineligible to make a refugee claim have a last-chance oppor-
tunity to acquire protected person status under the Pre-Re-
moval Risk Assessment (PRRA) just prior to being removed.
The grounds for protection under PRRA are the same as those
considered by the Board during refugee determination, and
applicants are screened for almost identical inadmissibility
criteria as are refugee claimants before they can be accepted
under the program. While the acceptance rate is exceedingly
low (less than 5 per cent) the few who are accepted may apply
for permanent residence. Because of these and other similari-
ties, the arguments set  forth  in this paper in the  refugee
determination context apply equally to the PRRA context.
14. IRPA, s. 100(3).
15. Ibid., s. 103 & 104.
16. CIC Refugees and Enforcement Branches, “Instructions for
Front-end processing of refugee protection claims” (27 Janu-
ary 2003).
17. Authority to detain refugee claimants in these circumstances
is provided by IRPA, s. 55(3)(a).
18. Per IRPA, s. 55(3)(a).
19. Ibid., s. 55(2)(a).
20. Ibid., s. 55(3)(b).
21. Ibid., s. 55(2)(b).
22. There are provisions for three-member panels in certain ex-
ceptional circumstances (IRPA, s. 163). This is new under
IRPA; under the previous  legislation, two-member  panels
were the rule (again with some exceptions).
23. In exceptional cases, where the claim is clearly a winning one,
the claim will be conducted informally on an “expedited”
basis.
24. IRPA, s. 98, referring to Articles E and F of the Refugee Con-
vention.
25. Ibid., s. 109(1).
26. Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, 2002
[IRPR] SOR/2002-227, Part 8, Div 1, s. 215(1)(c)
27. IRPR, s. 206(a).
28. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Rights to Employ-
ment, Education and Health Care," online: <http://www.
cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/asylum-5.html>.
29. Until April 2004, the province of Manitoba did not provide
social assistance to claimants.
30. Canadian Council for Refugees (CCR), Refugee Rights Day
Backgrounder, “Two steps forward, six steps back” (4 April
2003).
31. A.  Brouwer, Equal Access to Student Loans for Convention
Refugees (Ottawa: Caledon Institute of Social Policy, February
2000).
32. IRPA, s. 31.
33. Ibid., s. 108, reflecting Article 1C of the Refugee Convention.
34. IRPR, supra note 26.
Permanent Protection
97
35. As of August 2004, all provinces that participate in the Canada
Student Loan Program have harmonized their policies with
that of the federal government and grant the provincial part
of the loan to protected persons. Nunavut, the Northwest
Territories, and the province of Quebec, which operate their
own student assistance plans, do not give provincial assistance
at this time, though Quebec has indicated that it plans to do
so. See online: <http://www.cpj.ca/studentloans> for details.
36. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, online: <http://www.
cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/asylum-2.html> (date accessed: 12
April 2004).
37. Exceptions include voting rights, access to certain public po-
sitions, the right to hold a Canadian passport, etc.
38. Recognized refugees receive a reduction of up to one year in
the citizenship waiting period, to reflect the time spent in
Canada after refugee determination.
39. IRPR, s. 175. At the time of filing the application, protected
persons are required to pay a non-refundable processing fee
of $550 for each adult family member (22 years of age and
over) included in the application, as well as $150 for each
dependent child included in the application [IRPR s.
301(1)(b)]. Applicants may include dependants overseas in
this application. Failure to submit an application within this
time limit will result in the refugee forfeiting the opportunity
to be landed as a protected person. (They must apply on
humanitarian and compassionate grounds, and become sub-
ject to additional landing requirements, including medical
admissibility and a $975 Right of Landing Fee.) See IRPR
175(1); CIC Immigration Manual, Chapter PP 4: Processing
Protected Persons’ In-Canada Applications for Permanent
Resident Status, s. 9.3, online: <http://www.cic.gc.ca/manu-
als-guides/english/pp/pp04e.pdf>.
40. Telephone call to Citizenship and Immigration Canada Call
Centre by the author (March 2002).
41. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Applying for Perma-
nent Residence From Within Canada: Convention Refugees,”
11, online: <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdffiles/kits/ KIT2.
PDF> (date accessed: 8 April 2002).
42. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Applying for Perma-
nent Residence From Within Canada: Protected Persons and
Convention Refugees,” 11, online: <http://www.cic.gc.ca/
english/pdf/kits/guides/5205E.PDF> (date accessed 15 March
2003).
43. CIC maintains a Web page, updated weekly, which purports
to give information on actual processing times for applica-
tions; see online: <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/
times/process%2Din.html >. On December 26, 2003, the Web
site indicated a “current processing time” for applications for
permanent residence by refugees and protected persons of 208
days, and reported that as of December 22, 2003, CIC was
processing applications received up to June 3, 2003. There is
no information on the Web site about whether this figure is
an average or median processing time, or a minimum. This
figure is nearly double the 116-day processing time reported
less than a year ago, on March 15, 2003.
44. Another group in this position are persons who are suspected
of having had some association with an organization that is
suspected of having had links to terrorism.
45. The only option available is to seek a writ of mandamus from
the Federal Court, i.e. an order to CIC to make a decision on
the case. The lack of an effective complaint mechanism is a
long-standing concern of refugee policy advocates. The Cana-
dian Council for Refugees, the Coalition for a Just Immigra-
tion and Refugee Policy, the Sanctuary Coalition, and the
Maytree Foundation have all called for the establishment of an
effective, independent ombudsperson’s office.
46. Letter from D. McNamara, UN High Commission for Refu-
gees, Sharry Aiken, Canadian Council for Refugees (14 May
1997).
47. K. Jastram and K. Newland, “Family Unity and Refugee Pro-
tection” in Feller, Turk, and Nicholson, supra note 8 at 559.
48. Canadian Council for Refugees (CCR), Refugee Family Reuni-
fication: Report of the Canadian Council for Refugees Task Force
on Family Reunification (July 1995) at 14–20.
49. IRPR, supra note 39 at 7.
50. Conversation with Chris Pullenayagem, CPJ (25 May 2004).
51. According to CIC, the current processing period for work
authorizations is fifty-three days. See online: <http://www.
cic.gc.ca/english/department/times/process%2Din.html>
(date accessed: 26 December 2003).
52. H.S. Mohamed and A. Hashi, Beyond Settlement: Economic and
Occupational Adjustment of the Somalis in the Ottawa-Carleton
Region: Report of the Task Force on Employment Project for the
Somali Community (October 1998).
53. Refugee Convention, Art. 7(1).
54. Ibid., Art. 3.
55. Ibid., Art. 4.
56. Ibid., Art. 16.
57. Ibid., Art. 22(1).
58. Ibid., Art. 23.
59. Ibid., Art. 24(1)(a).
60. Ibid., Art. 24(1)(b).
61. Ibid., Art. 15.
62. Ibid., Art. 17.
63. Ibid., Art. 13.
64. Ibid., Art. 21.
65. Ibid., Art. 22(2).
66. Ibid., Art. 26.
67. Ibid., Art. 25.
68. Ibid., Art. 27.
69. Ibid., Art. 28.
70. These include the right of association (Art. 15), wage-earning
employment (Art. 17), self employment (Art. 18), access to
liberal professions (Art. 19), housing (Art. 21), public relief
(Art. 23), labour legislation and social security (Art. 24), free-
dom of movement (Art. 26), travel documents (Art. 28), and
expulsion (Art. 32).
71. G. Goodwin-Gill and J. Kumin, Refugees in Limbo and Can-
ada’s International Obligations (Ottawa: Caledon Institute of
Social Policy, September 2000).
Volume 22 Refuge Number 2
98
72. Refugee Convention, “Declarations other than those made
under section B of article 1 and Reservations,” online:
<http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty2ref.htm>.
73. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 22 May 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, Can. T.S. 1980/37 (entered into force 27 January
1980, accession by Canada 14 October 1970) [Vienna Conven-
tion] Art. 31(3). See also Jastram and Newland, supra note 47
at 569.
74. ICCPR, supra note 7.
75. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, 3 January 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, Can. T.S. 1976/46
(entered into force 3 January 1976, accession by Canada 19
May 1976) [ICESCR].
76. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation, 21 December 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, Can. T.S.
1970/28 (entered into  force 4  January 1969, accession by
Canada 14 October 1970).
77. Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, 18 December 1979,  1239 U.N.T.S. 13, Can.  T.S.
1982/31 (entered into force 3 September 1981, accession by
Canada 10 December 1981) [CEDAW].
78. Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, Can.
T.S. 1992/3 (entered into force 2 September 1990, accession
by Canada 13 December 1991) [Children’s Convention], on-
line: <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/k2crc.htm>.
79. D. Weissbrodt, Prevention of Discrimination: The rights of non-
citizens. Final report of the special Rapporteur, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23 (2 May 2003) at 6.
80. ICESCR, supra 75, Art. 2(2). Note the exception for states in
transition, which does not include Canada, Art. 2(3).
81. Weissbrodt, supra note 79 at 50.
82. CERD, supra note 76, Art. 1(3).
83. United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Dis-
crimination, “General Recommendation No. 14: Definition of
discrimination” (22 March 1993).
84. ICESCR, supra 75, Art. 10(1).
85. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 26 June 1981
(entered into force 21 October 1986), Art. 18(1).
86. European Social Charter, 18 October 1961 (entered into force
26 February 1965), Art. 16.
87. Jastram and Newland, supra n. 47 at 566.
88. Ibid. at 566. The authors also note: “The right to marry and
found a family … includes the right to maintain a family life
together. The right to a shared family life is also drawn from
the prohibition against arbitrary interference with the family
… and from the special family rights accorded to children
under international law.”
89. Children’s Convention, Art. 3(1).
90. Ibid., Arts. 9 and 10.
91. Ibid., Art. 10(1).
92. Ibid., Art. 10(2).
93. Final Act of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiar-
ies on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, 1951, UN
Doc. A/CONF.2/108/Rev.1 (26 November 1952) Recommen-
dation B.
94. Goodwin-Gill and Kumin, supra note 71 at 6.
95. Refugee Convention, Art. 17. In addition, UNHCR’s Execu-
tive  Committee has  issued Conclusions elaborating  state
obligations with respect to the employment of refugees.
96. See for example, Ahani v. Canada (2002), 58 O.R. (3d) 107
(C.A.). In his dissent Rosenberg J.A. summarizes the govern-
ment’s position with respect to its obligations as a party to
the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.
97. Vienna Convention, supra note 73, Art. 26.
98. The most cited case for this principle is the 1956 Supreme
Court case of Francis v. The Queen [1956] S.C.R 618.
99. P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 1999 student ed.
(Toronto: Carswell, 1999) at 33.8(c), citing Re Powers to Levy
Rates on Foreign Legations [1943] S.C.R. 208.
100. Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson [1989] 1 S.C.R 1038.
101. [1998] 1 S.C.R 982.
102. The cases are Thomson v. Thomson, [1994] 3 S.C.R 551, and
Canada (AG) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R 689. For a discussion
on this point see G. Van Ert, Using International Law in
Canadian Courts (London: Kluwer, 2002) at 229b–c.
103. [1999] 2 S.C.R 817.
104. Ibid., quoting R. Sullivan, Dreidger on the Construction of
Statutes, 3rd ed. 1994) at 330.
105. IRPA, s. 3(2)(b).
106. See, for example, Martinez v. M.C.I., [2003] F.C.J. No. 1695;
Charkaoui (Re), [2003] F.C.J. No. 1816; Rimoldi v. M.C.I.,
[2003] F.C.J. No. 1877; Li v. M.C.I., [2003] F.C.J. No. 1934;
and. Dennis v. M.C.I., [2004] F.C.J. No. 223.
107. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, online:
<http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/asylum-2.html>
(date accessed 12 April 2004).
108. The House of Commons Standing Committee on Citizen-
ship and Immigration, in their report on the draft Immigra-
tion and Refugee Protection Regulations, called for a regulatory
provision going even further: “Those granted refugee or
protected person status by the IRB should be granted perma-
nent resident status within 60 days of the receipt of their
application for permanent residence, with the IRB’s determi-
nation of identity considered valid for this purpose.” [House
of Commons Standing Committee on Citizenship and Im-
migration. Report on Proposed Immigration and Refugee
Protection Regulations (20 March 20 2002) Recommenda-
tion 41.]
109. The specific grounds for inadmissibility will be discussed
below.
110. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Operations Memoran-
dum: Refugees – Time to apply for landing – Regulation 40, IL
95-02, October 16, 1995.
111. Meeting with Gerry Van Kessel, Director General, Refugees,
Citizenship and Immigration Canada (February 2001).
112. See, for example, J.C. Hathaway, “Toward the Reformulation
of International Refugee Law” (1996) 15:1 Refuge 1–5.
113. A further legal problem with maintaining the distinction is
that permanent residence is a prerequisite in Canada for
naturalization, or citizenship, and Article 34 of the Refugee
Convention obliges states to “facilitate” naturalization. While
Permanent Protection
99
this certainly does not in itself amount to a right to either
naturalization or permanent residence, it does suggest that
permanent residence is more than simply a privilege to be
granted or withheld at the whim of host states. Under the
Convention, refugees can legitimately expect Canadian poli-
cies to “facilitate” their obtaining Canadian  citizenship,
which necessarily includes granting them the prerequisite of
permanent resident status.
114. A good example is the complicated nature of the harmoniza-
tion of federal and provincial regulations and policies with
respect to student loans for refugees. In spite of the an-
nouncement in the federal budget of February 2003 that
protected persons were eligible to receive student loans, only
in May 2004 did the province of Ontario adopt a policy that
reflects this change in the province.
115. IRPA, s. 44–46.
116. The author and Citizens for Public Justice have put forward
a number of concrete proposals in this regard. For details
contact Citizens for Public Justice at cpj@cpj.ca.
Andrew Brouwer practices law with Jackman and Associates
in Toronto, and is a member of the Executive Committee of
the Canadian Council for Refugees. He has written numer-
ous articles and papers on the issue of refugees in limbo in
Canada. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance
of Chris Pullenayegem and Caitlin Hayward, who provided
valuable research and advice, and adapted a longer version
of this paper for publication. Thanks also to Janet Dench,
Ninette Kelley, Harry Kits, Judith Kumin, John Frecker and
Geri Sadoway for their comments and suggestions on various
drafts. Notwithstanding their excellent input, the responsi-
bility for any errors in this paper lies solely with the author.
Volume 22 Refuge Number 2
100
